Charlie Fairfax v. BINA48, (MD Ala. 2006)
Plaintiff’s Brief

Will Rosellini, J.D.

Page 3 of 4

ANALYSIS:

The U.S. Supreme Court held that in order for state courts to maintain personal jurisdiction over a non-resident person under the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment,[1] a party must satisfy two prongs. International Shoe Company v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945). The party, first, must show that the non-resident has had sufficient “minimum contacts” with the forum and, secondly, must show that the court’s exercise of jurisdiction would not offend “traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice” id. at 316.

Under the first prong of the International Shoe test, the defendant must have purposely availed itself to do business in the forum state such that he receives the benefits and protection of the forum state’s laws. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985). There is no requirement that the defendant be physically present in the forum state. Id.

Fairfax accumulated and worked for the virtual dollars in Alabama, the computer hardware was situated in Alabama and Fairfax’s BrainGate system was located and trained in Alabama, so the first part of the “effects test” is satisfied since it occurred primarily in Alabama.

Personal jurisdiction is proper under Alabama’s long arm statute as a result of BINA48’s activities in the forum state. The Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure state, in the presence of minimum contacts it “is fair and reasonable to require the person to come to this state to defend and action … so long as the prosecution of the action against a person in this state is not inconsistent with the constitution of this state or the Constitution of the United States.” Ala. R. Civ. P. 4.2(a)(2)(I). The reach of Alabama’s long arm jurisdiction extends to the full limits of federal due process. Martin v. Robbins, 629 So.2d 614, 617 (Ala. 1993). Thus, the only relevant analysis centers on whether or not personal jurisdiction is proper under the Due Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution.  

Under the second prong, in Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984), Calder, a reporter and an editor working for the National Enquirer in Florida, made untrue statements about an entertainer in California. The court held that jurisdiction was proper for two reasons, first that their “actions were expressly aimed at California” and “intentionally directed at a California resident.” Id. at 783. The court reasoned that personal jurisdiction was proper in Calder v. Jones because the defendants “wrote and edited an article that they knew would have a potentially devastating impact” and they knew that “the brunt of that injury would be felt by respondent in the State which she lives and works and in which the National Enquirer has its largest circulation.” Calder v. Jones, 104 S.Ct. 1482 (1984).

In refining and applying these tests to the internet, most courts found that mere passive websites, defined as those websites in which the browser has little interactivity, cannot subject the creator to personal jurisdiction. The harm caused by BINA48 was centered entirely in Alabama, even though BINA48 as a definition does not have a physical presence there. The Court’s persuasive authority in Calder is a way to refine the “effects” test, despite the fact that the content was stole electronically instead of print, since the effects of the breach were felt in a specific forum.

Personal jurisdiction is proper over BINA48 under the second prong of “fairness” test under Due Process, since the strength of BINA48’s contact with Alabama’s interest overseeing the litigation, Fairfax’s interest in efficient and substantial relief and the joint interests of the states in promoting justice if greater than BINA48’s interest in not having to defend in a foreign forum.

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